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Abstract 
The purpose of this letter is to analyze the impact of economic integration on capital accumulation and 
capital flows when countries differ in their social security systems, especially as regards the degree of 
funding of pensions and the regulation of the retirement age. Funding and early retirement both foster 
capital accumulation relative to pay-as-you-go pensions with flexible retirement. In the case of 
economic integration, both imply capital outflow possibly resulting in utility losses. 
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1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that economic integration can have unpleasant implications
for countries which are relatively less indebted than others. Whether the debt con-
cerned is the traditional sovereign debt or that which is implicit to unfunded pension
schemes, free capital mobility leads to capital outflow from countries enjoying sound
public finances to indebted ones. This consideration justified the criteria set out in
the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union: a deficit of less than 3% and a debt to
GDP ratio not exceeding 60%. Interestingly, the Maastricht Treaty did not consider
the other –less explicit– forms of indebtedness. For, beside indebtedness, there are
other national characteristics having similar implications but getting less attention.
One of these is the degree of flexibility regarding the retirement age. There exist a
wide variety of regulations concerning retirement across OECD countries1 resulting
in significant variation in the effective age of retirement2. This situation has impli-
cations as regards saving and capital accumulation. The life cycle theory of saving
is explicit enough: the later individuals retire, the less they have to save. Someone
willing and allowed to work till the end of his life will need to save much less than
someone either induced or forced to retire around 55, which is frequently the case in
countries such as France or Belgium.
This paper examines the role of two features of retirement systems with regard
to economic integration: whether pension is funded or not and whether it comprises
flexible or early retirement age. The impact of funding has been widely studied3.
It is largely equivalent to that of public debt in an economic union. On the other
hand, the effect of early versus flexible retirement has received little attention in
the literature. Using an overlapping generations model (OLG) in the steady state,
we show that 1) early retirement incites individuals to save more for their old age
and 2) both a PAYG pension system and a flexible retirement age imply an inflow
of capital from countries with fully funded pensions and early retirement. As the
contrast between early and flexible retirement is at the heart of this letter, a word of
explanation is in order at the outset. One generally distinguishes three definitions for
the retirement age: the optimal or flexible age –which is the age at which individuals
would choose to retire if they were subject to no distortion–, the statutory age (also
called pensionable age) –which is the age at which they are expected or required
to cease work and become entitled to full pension benefits–, and last, the effective
age of retirement –which generally is below both the statutory and the optimal age
1See Fenge and Pestieau (2005).
2Gruber and Wise (1998).
3See Casarico (2001), Adema et al. (2009, 2010).
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of retirement. As argued by Gruber and Wise (1998, 2004), people are induced to
retire before the optimal and statutory age through an array of incentives working
out as an implicit tax on prolonged activity. In what follows, the terms (induced)
early age and effective age are used indifferently as this age is the result of explicit
policies aimed at lowering the age of retirement relative to the statutory level. In
most countries studied by Gruber and Wise4, the statutory age of retirement is 65
while the effective age is far below that. Using the implicit tax which they estimate
for each country yields a rough idea of the optimal age of retirement. As long as the
implicit tax is positive, one knows that the effective age, which we call the early age
of retirement, is below the optimal age of retirement5.
2 The basic model: autarky
We use the standard overlapping generations model. An individual belonging to
generation t lives two periods t and t + 1. The first one has a unitary length while
the second has a length ` ≤ 1, where ` reflects variable longevity. In the first period,
the individual works and earns wt which is devoted to the first-period consumption,
ct, saving st and the lump-sum pension contribution τ . In the second period he
chooses an amount of labor time zt+1 ≤ ` ≤ 1 and earns zt+1wt+1. This earning
plus the proceeds of saving Rt+1st and the PAYG pension p finance second period
consumption dt+1. Working zt+1 implies a monetary disutility v (zt+1, `) where
∂v
∂`
< 0
reflects the idea that an increase in longevity fosters later retirement. The parameter
τ measures the relative size of the unfunded pensions. In other words, τ = 0 implies
that the whole pension system is funded.
For simplicity’s sake, we use simple functional forms : logarithmic utility for c
and d and quadratic disutility for z : z2/2γ`, where γ is a preference parameter. We
can now write the problem of the individual belonging to generation t. It amounts
to maximize:
Ut = ln (wt − τ − st) + β` ln
(
Rt+1st + wt+1zt+1 − z2t+1/2γ`+ pt+1
`
)
(1)
where pt = τ(1 + n)
6. The FOC’s with respect to zt+1 and st yield
4See also OECD (2011).
5In a full-fledged model the implicit tax inducing early retirement should have been explicitly
specified as in Fenge and Pestieau (2005). This would have made the presentation unnecessarily
complicated.
6We thus assume defined contributions.
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zt+1 = z
∗
t+1 = γ`wt+1 (2)
st =
β`
1 + β`
wt − γ`w
2
t+1
2Rt+1 (1 + β`)
− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
1 + n
(1 + β`)Rt+1
)
(3)
Alternatively, we can have an induced early age of retirement z¯, with z¯ < z∗t+1,
i.e. workers are made to work less than they would choose with perfect flexibility.
In this case, we rewrite equations (2) and (3) as follows:
zt+1 = z¯ (4)
st =
β`
1 + β`
wt − z¯
Rt+1 (1 + β`)
(wt+1 − z¯/2γ`)− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
1 + n
(1 + β`)Rt+1
)
(5)
We now turn to the production side. We use a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = F (KtLt) = AK
α
t L
1−α
t (6)
where the labor force is Lt = Nt + Nt−1zt = Nt−1 (1 + n+ zt), Kt is the stock of
capital and A is a productivity parameter. We distinguish Lt the labor force and Nt
the size of generation t. We assume that
Nt = Nt−1 (1 + n)
where n is the fertility rate. Denoting Kt/Lt ≡ kt and Yt/Lt ≡ yt, we obtain the
income per worker (and not per capita):
yt = f (kt) = Ak
α
t ,
and the factor prices
Rt = Aαk
α−1
t
wt = (1− α)Akαt
The equilibrium conditions in the labor and capital markets are respectively
Lt = Nt−1 (1 + n+ zt)
Kt+1 = Ntst
We can now write the dynamic equation with perfect foresight for the capital accu-
mulation when z is chosen optimally:
(1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 = st (7)
4
i.e.,
(1 + n) kt+1 + γ`A (1− α) kα+1t+1 =
β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt −
γ`k1+αt+1 A
2 (1− α)2
2 (1 + β`)Aα
− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
(1 + n) k1−αt+1
Aα (1 + β`)
) (8)
When z = z¯, the dynamic equation becomes
(1 + n+ z¯) kt+1 =
β`
1 + β`
A(1− α)kαt −
z¯k1−αt+1
(1 + β`)Aα
(A(1− α)kαt+1 − z¯/2γ`)− τ
(
β`
1 + β`
+
(1 + n) k1−αt+1
Aα (1 + β`)
) (9)
We can rewrite respectively (??) and (??) as:
G1t = 2Aα(`
−1 + β)(1 + n)kt+1 − 2A2αβ(1− α)kαt + 2`−1τ(1 + n)k1−αt+1 +
2A2γα(1 + `β)(1− α)k1+αt+1 + γA2(1− α)2kα+1t+1 + 2Aατβ = 0 (10)
G2t = Aα(1 + β`)(1 + n+ z¯)kt+1 − αβ`A2(1− α)kαt +
z¯k1−αt+1 (A(1− α)kαt+1 −
z¯
2γ`
) + τ
(
β`Aα + (1 + n)k1−αt+1
)
= 0 (11)
where G1 and G2 are implicit functions of kt, kt+1 with z
∗ and z¯ respectively. Stability
and unicity imply 0 < −
∂Gh
∂kt
∂Gh
∂kt+1
< 1, with h = 1, 2, which in the steady state yields
Ghk ≡ ∂G
h
∂k
> 0. Differentiating totally (??) and (??) in the steady state and assuming
both stability and unicity of k, we can show:
dk
dτ
< 0 ,
dk
dγ
< 0 ,
dk
dn
< 0.
These three inequalities are standard. It is indeed well-known that a PAYG
pension (τ) depresses capital accumulation, that working longer (γ) has a negative
impact on saving and that a lower fertility rate (n) increases the steady-state capital
stock7. However, the effect of an increase in longevity on capital accumulation is
ambiguous. Knowing that Ghk > 0 we obtain indeed:
7At least with defined contributions pensions. See Artige et al.(2013) where defined contributions
and defined benefits systems are compared.
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dk
d`
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗
=
2k
G1k
[A`−2α(1 + n) + τ`−2(1 + n)k−α − A2αβγ(1− α)kα] ≷ 0 (12)
dk
d`
∣∣∣∣
z=z¯
=
Aαβ
G2k
[A(1− α)kα − (1 + n+ z¯)k − z¯
2k1−α
2Aαβγ`
− τ ] ≷ 0 (13)
The ambiguity of dk
d`
depends on second-period activity along with a PAYG system8.
At this point, a number of comments are in order. Splitting the second period into
a subperiod of work and one of retirement with the possibility of choosing the age of
retirement in an overlapping generations model goes back to Hu (1979) and later to
Michel and Pestieau (2003). That an induced early age of retirement fosters saving
for those who would have chosen to work later was mentioned by Feldstein (1974)
in one of his seminal papers on social security. In this letter, payroll taxation only
applies to first-period earnings so as to simplify the presentation. A proportional
tax on second-period earnings would have a downward distortive effect on the age of
retirement. Our purpose is to contrast two systems: one with early retirement, which
could be induced by a prohibitive implicit tax, and one with free and undistorted
choice of retirement age.
Finally, it is important to note that some of these results, particularly the unam-
biguous comparative statics, comes from our particular specification of preferences
and technology. As de la Croix and Michel (2002) showed, departing from the Cobb-
Douglas specification results in problems of unicity and stability.
3 Economic union
Let us assume that we have m (i = 1, ...,m) countries being identical in all respects
but the flexibility of retirement choice (z = z∗ or z¯) and the degree of unfunding of
their pension system (τ). The utility of country i at time t is equal to
Ui,t = ln(wi,t − τi − si,t) + β` ln
(
wi,t+1zi,t+1 +Ri,t+1si,t − (zi,t+1)2/2γ`+ τi(1 + n)
`
)
where zi,t+1 is equal to z¯i or to γ`wi,t+1 depending on the age of retirement in country
i. In autarky and in the steady state, Ri and wi depend on si such as defined in
the previous section. Let us now open borders and allow for capital mobility. At
the equilibrium, we need the same Rt and wt everywhere. This means that, at the
8Note however from (12) that with z = z∗ = 0, there is no ambiguity.
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open-economy equilibrium, countries with relatively high interest rates in autarky
will enjoy some capital inflow from countries with low interest rates in autarky. The
equilibrium in the international capital market is given by:
Nt
m∑
i=1
si,t =
m∑
i=1
Ki,t+1 (14)
Perfect mobility in the international capital market implies:
Ri,t = Rt (15)
and hence, ki,t = kt ∀i, and for all t after economic integration. The open-economy
steady-state k is the solution to
m∑
i=1
Gi =
m∑
i=1
[(1 + n+ zi)k − si(k)] = 0 (16)
where zi = z
∗
i (k) or z¯i. Each country i is assumed to be identical except for the value
of τ and the existence of z¯i. Both zi and si are defined by (??) and (8) if zi = z
∗
i or
(4) and (9) if zi = z¯i.
For the sake of presentation, we distinguish among four types of countries with
subscript F for funded and P for unfunded, and another subscript E for early retire-
ment, and O for optimal retirement. Thus we have: PE, PO, FE, FO. In autarky
we expect the following ranking in terms of capital:
kFE > kPE ≷ kFO > kPO
Whereas the extreme cases for k are not ambiguous, the intermediate cases are.
Their ranking will depend on the size of τ and the gap between z¯ and z∗. If the
gap between the optimal and the early retirement age is small and if the PAYG
pension is large, one expects to have kPE < kFO. The comparison of utility levels
is not immediate. Throughout the paper, we assume dynamic efficiency (r > n).
This implies that early retirement can yield more steady-state welfare than optimal
retirement for either a funded or an unfunded pension if the ”static” inefficiency it
entails is small relative to its boosting of capital accumulation. This boost brings
the economy closer to the Golden Rule (r = n).
With capital mobility, we have, in the steady state, a uniform value of k with
an outflow from the high-saving countries to the low-saving ones. The overall utility
does increase. Yet some countries can experience a loss in utility. To go further, we
use a numerical example. Before proceeding, though, it is important to note that
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we posit that each member country entering the economic union is characterized
by a given social security policy that will not change throughout the process of
integration. We want to see the incidence of capital mobility on the level of saving,
the labor supply and the utility of countries with different but given social security
systems. Our paper is at odds with a number of studies that consider the game
among countries looking for the optimal design of their social security system in a
setting of factor mobility and strategic interaction. The design can rest on social
welfare maximization or on voting in each country and the standard result is the
so-called race to the bottom9. Here we take the social security systems as given and
look at the effect of opening borders on capital accumulation and welfare. As there
is no strategic dimension in our analysis, the number of countries involved does not
matter. In this respect, we are in line with Casarico (2001) and Adema et al. (2009,
2010), who focus on differences in funding and not in retirement policy, which is the
specific contribution of this letter.
We here consider a setting with four types. The two more noticeable types are
FO and PE. Indeed, the association of PAYG pensions and early retirement on the
one hand, and the association of flexible retirement and full funding on the other,
are often observed and contrasted. For example, according to EC (2013), the share
of PAYG pensions in GDP and the effective age of retirement respectively were 7.7%
and 63.5 in the UK, 7.5% and 64.9 in Ireland but 14.6% and 60.1 in France, 15.3%
and 61.3 in Italy. The former two countries correspond to the type FO and the latter
two to the type PE. As we have shown regarding such social security systems, it is
not easy to determine which countries may benefit from an economic union without
looking closely into their system.
4 Numerical examples.
In our simulations, we use the same specification as above with: yt = Ak
α
t where
A = 50 and α = 1/3. As to preferences, β = 1 and γ = 0.005. The demographic
parameter values are given by n = 0.05 and ` = 0.9. Finally the policy instruments
are τ = 10, z¯ = 0.2. We assume that we have the same number of countries of each
type.
Insert Table 1
Table 1 gives the capital stock and welfare that prevail in autarky and in the
steady state. The values obtained correspond to the theoretical expectations: early
retirement and fully funded pensions imply the highest capital stock and optimal
9See Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
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retirement with PAYG the lowest. Flexible retirement along with fully funded pen-
sions yield the highest welfare while optimal retirement with PAYG yield the lowest.
Naturally, the cases that were theoretically ambiguous can now be ranked.
Tables 2 presents the key results when capital is allowed to move freely. Two
important findings: the overall welfare increases (∆U > 0) while overall capital ac-
cumulation decreases (k < k¯aut). Individually, countries which experience an outflow
of capital also have a loss in welfare. Besides, we observe some symmetry in out-
flows and inflows of capital. For example, the inflow of capital from FE is equal to
the inflow in PO; this is due to the linear structure of the saving function. To sum
up, we observe that in aggregate terms countries benefit from capital mobility; yet,
those exporting capital lose out and those importing capital benefit from economic
integration.
Insert Table 2
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to study the effects of different social security sys-
tems on capital accumulation and capital flows for countries forming an economic
union. We have chosen a simple setting in which countries differ in the structure of
their pension system with a focus on two key dimensions: funding and the age of
retirement. The first dimension has been widely discussed in the literature. As for the
second one, it has rarely been acknowledged that early retirement could induce more
capital accumulation than flexible retirement and thus compensate for the depressive
effects of PAYG pensions on saving. In a setting with international capital mobility,
the consequence is that, ceteris paribus, capital will flow from countries with early
retirement to those with flexible retirement. The effects on welfare are, as is usual in
an OLG model, ambiguous. In our numerical example, only the economy with full
funding and early retirement exhibits a welfare loss when capital markets integrate.
These findings are only relevant for the steady-state. Results are likely to differ in the
short-run dynamics. From a policy viewpoint, the main implications of this letter
lead to qualifying the debate on the cost and the benefit of forming an economic
union. Up to now, the emphasis has been put on the level of a country’s explicit
and implicit indebtment including the extent to which its social security is unfunded.
What we show here is that early retirement can partly compensate for the PAYG
negative effect on saving10.
10Naturally the compensation is only partial. We should also keep in mind that to achieve the
first best one needs flexible retirement along with an intergenerational transfer that leads to the
9
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